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The present work attempts to explicate the philosophical method of Wittgenstein, which 
he formulated in the Tractatus in order to determine the meanings of our linguistic 
expressions by analyzing the basic structure of the language. Wittgenstein attempts to 
show that traditional philosophical problems can be avoided entirely by application of an 
appropriate methodology. The analysis of language is one important tool of solving 
problems. The role of language as a central concerned of Analytic philosophers is the 
dimension most involved in disputes about the methodology employed. My 
understanding about Wittgenstein’s concept of language in his two philosophies is 
founded on the methods that he adopts. He formulated two different methods of 
philosophy and produced two philosophies on the basis of his theories of meaning, i.e., 
picture and use theories. I intend here to study about the theory of meaning that 
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WITTGENSTEIN’S METHOD OF PHILOSOPHICAL ANALYSIS 
 
Wittgenstein is one of the great philosophers of twentieth century analytic philosophy to emerge from the 
English speaking world. A number of examples can be given for this claim to greatness. It has been said that 
every great philosopher has turned the direction of philosophical discussion. Considering the works that set a 
landmark in the discourse of philosophical issues, Wittgenstein can be praised as a trendsetter - he has occupied 
his own place in the history of western philosophy, general and analytic. He changed the method and direction 
of philosophical pursuit twice during his life time. Stuart Shanker critically assessed Wittgenstein’s contribution 
thus: ‘To be the author of two revolutions is perhaps, unparalleled. Yet, it is not entirely unaccountable, if one 
considers the exceptional temperament and gift which Wittgenstein brought to his study of philosophy.’i 
  
The Tractatus Logico-Philosophicusii (hereafter refers to as Tractatus) is Wittgenstein’s first contribution; 
published in 1921, just after World War I. The second found final form in his Philosophical Investigations 
(hereafter referred to as P.I.), published posthumously in 1953, after World War II. These two major works 
created a new movement and turned philosophy in another direction. It may be said that without knowing 
Wittgenstein’s philosophy, it is perhaps not possible to understand either the philosophy of language in a general 
sense, or analytic philosophy. His contributions to philosophy have substantially changed the theory of 
description and meaning, and severs the tradition from Bertrand Russell and G. E. Moore within British 
contemporary philosophy. However, Northop Frye remarks that these two phases of Wittgenstein’s philosophy 
are ‘a distinction between two types of artistic genius’, which he refers to as ‘the conservative’ and the 
‘revolutionary’.’iii There are, of course, many lines of connection that show a continuous thought in the ideas of 
his early and later work, but the differences between them are also very clear. These differences are observed in 
the philosophical methods adopted by Wittgenstein in his two works. This change in the method of 
philosophical analysis parallels the change in the conception of language in the philosophy of Wittgenstein. 
 
The Tractatus and P.I. are both the results of the most extreme exactitude and care, both evolved over a long 
period of time with constant revision, rewriting and rearrangement, and both reflect the same kind of structural 
thinking and desire for thoroughness and completeness. The Proto-Tractatus, the Notebook and the Blue and 
Brown Books are the rudimentary works and the basis of these two major works. But the treatment of tones and 
styles in these two works are indeed very different. The Tractatus is carefully designed just like a crystal, 
seemingly broken up into many facets until we see how problematic it is underneath. The P.I., on the other 
hand, is like an ocean which has to be sounded again and again until we find its bottom, for there are depths 
beyond depths concealed beneath its seemingly casual tone. 
 
The most important contribution from Wittgenstein is the introduction of a new method of inquiry into 
philosophical analysis; and there is considerable merit as well as self-insight. Wittgenstein changes the way of 
doing philosophy by giving more emphasis to the analysis of language. He defines philosophy in the Tractatus 
as ‘All philosophy is a ‘critique of language’. It was Russell who performed the service of showing that the 
apparent logical form of proposition need not be its real one’.iv The limits of my language are the limits of my 
world. If we misunderstand/misinterpret the meanings of the language, then we will fail to describe the clear 
picture of the world. By misinterpretation of the meanings of language, philosophers are trapped in a linguistic 
puzzlement and that multiplies the problems. Analytic philosophers think that the main task of philosophy is 
either to solve or to dissolve the problems in the philosophical discourse by way of correct interpretation of 
meanings that describe the world. But in addition to his substantive contribution to the theory of meaning, the 
philosophy of mind, epistemology, aesthetics, ethics, and the philosophy of psychology and of mathematics 
have been enormously influenced, (though in each of these cases, the results achieved are not necessarily 
associated with the method itself). 
 
Erich Heller, in respect of Wittgenstein’s impact on the philosophical community, succinctly pointed out the 
following: 
 
Wittgenstein was also an Austrian who conquered British philosophy; but this, as befits Austrian 
conquests, was due to a misunderstanding. At least he himself believed that it was so. When the pages of 
the journal of Mind were filled with variations of his philosophical themes, he praised a certain 
American detective story magazines, and wondered how, with the offer of such reading matter, ‘anyone 
can read Mind with all its importance and bankruptcy’. When his influence at Oxford was its height, he 
referred to it as ‘a philosophical desert’ and ‘the influence area’. These are ironical exaggerations, but 
undoubtedly serious as expressions of Wittgenstein’s discontent. v 
 
The early work of Wittgenstein is mainly devoted to a study of the structural meaning of language in relation to 
the reality of the world. Russell’s remarks that Wittgenstein is concerned with a logically perfect language and 
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not with any ordinary language is just true if we see that Wittgenstein is interested in the problem of description. 
To forbid nonsense it is enough to show that the true function of language is to describe. Metaphysics is only a 
pseudo-description.vi His early philosophical work, though it was more or less similar to the view of Russell’s 
Logical Atomism, has influenced the emergence of the new philosophical movement of the Logical Positivism 
of the Vienna Circle. And the later work has given a new impetus in the development of ordinary language 
philosophy that centred on the Oxford analysis. By his own philosophical works and through his influence on 
several generations of other thinkers, Wittgenstein transformed the nature of philosophical activity. From two 
distinct approaches, he sought to show that traditional philosophical problems can be avoided entirely by 
application of an appropriate methodology, one that focuses on analysis of language.vii The role of language as a 
central concern of Analytic philosophers is the dimension most involved in disputes about the methodology 
employed. 
 
The present work attempts to explicate the philosophical method of Wittgenstein, which he formulated in the 
Tractatus in order to determine the meanings of our linguistic expressions by analyzing the basic structure of the 
language. Wittgenstein says about the method of philosophy in his Tractatus that:  
 
The correct method of philosophy would really be the following: to say nothing except what can be said, 
i.e., propositions of natural science – i.e., something that has nothing to do with philosophy – and then, 
whatever someone else wanted to say something metaphysical, to demonstrate to him that he had failed 
to give meaning to certain signs in his propositions. Although it would not be satisfying to the other 
person – he would not have the feeling that we were teaching him philosophy – this method would be 
only strictly correct one.viii 
 
The above philosophical method that Wittgenstein has adopted in the Tractatus is a logical method that 
determines the truth or falsity of a proposition. It relates the analysis of language for determining its meanings 
through which we describe the facts of the world. Language and the analysis of the concepts expressed by the 
language have become an important method and a central concern of philosophy. He believes that only 
propositions with an empirical reference have meaning at all. The Logical Positivists to a certain extent blindly 
followed Wittgenstein’s position on the meanings of linguistic expressions. According to him, language is not 
conventional symbolism. The essential business of language is, to the early Wittgenstein, to assert or deny facts. 
Given the syntax of a language, the meaning of a sentence is determined as soon as the meaning of the 
component words is known.ix A proposition has meaning because it pictures the fact which it stands for or 
represents. Wittgenstein thinks that the essence of the proposition is to be found in hieroglyphic writing which 
pictures the facts it describes. The pictorial character of language remains unchanged because the logical picture 
or proposition is a picture either true or false of the fact. There is a commonality in the structure of both fact and 
picture. To understand the theory, it is necessary to examine Wittgenstein’s concepts of fact, picture and their 
logical relations. 
 
According to Wittgenstein, a fact is whatever the case is and also whatever is not the case. The notion of fact is 
treated by him as ultimate and indefinable. Any sort of picture is a fact including the fact that the elements of a 
picture are related to one another. He clearly makes a difference between a fact and an object. The objects are 
the constituents of a fact. It may be described, however, as a combination of simple objects. For example, the 
proposition, ‘There is a tree in front of the house’ may be considered as a fact. The tree and the house are 
different objects. These objects are the elements of a fact. This fact also has a structure in order to establish a 
relationship between these two different objects. At the same time, these two objects may constitute another 
different fact. Two facts may have the same objects as constituents but the structure or the form would differ. It 
shows the different forms of relationship of the objects. The fact depicts logical pictures of the different 
relationship of the objects. As Wittgenstein puts it: ‘Objects are what is unalterable and subsistent; their 
configuration is what is changing and unstable’. ‘The configuration of objects produces states of affairs’.x It is 
important to remember that the structure is not a separate element in a fact. The facts can be divided into Atomic 
and Complex facts. The atomic facts are the facts which cannot further be divided. But they are constituted as 
relation of different simple objects. Whereas, the complex facts are those composed of atomic facts, which can 
further be analysed in terms of the basic constituent parts. Thus, Wittgenstein says that the world is the totality 
of facts.  
 
Another important concept in Wittgenstein’s philosophy is the concept of picture. He analyses this concept in 
the form of model construction. He tells us that pictures present the existence and non-existence of atomic facts. 
He writes as follows: 
 
A picture is a model of reality. In a picture objects have the elements of the picture corresponding to 
them. In a picture the elements of the picture are the representatives of objects. What constitutes a 
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picture is that its elements are related to one another in a determinate way. The fact that the elements of a 
picture are related to one another in a determinate way represents that things are related to one another in 
the same way. 
 
Let us call connexion of its elements the structure of the picture, and let us call the possibility of this 
structure the pictorial form of the picture. xi   
 
Wittgenstein further analyses the essential features of a picture in terms of logical propositions. The essential 
features of a picture are, according to him, preserved in the proposition. 
 
In a proposition, a thought can be expressed in such a way that elements of the propositional sign 
correspond to the objects of thought. I call such elements of the ‘simple signs’. And such a proposition 
‘completely analysed’. The simple signs employed in propositions are called names. A name means an 
object. The object is its meaning, (‘A’ is the same sign as ‘A’.). The configuration of objects in a 
situation corresponds to the configuration of simple signs in the propositional sign.xii 
 
The picture and the facts pictured are according to Wittgenstein, the same in the sense that they must belong to 
the same genre. ‘A picture can depict any reality whose form it has. A spatial picture can depict anything spatial, 
a coloured one anything coloured, etc.’xiii A photograph, for instance, is in space and can, therefore, repeat the 
exact spatial relations of the fact it pictures, a face, a tree, or whatever it is. But this seems to raise a difficulty. 
We may ask a question how does a proposition picture spatial fact, the proposition not being in space? 
Wittgenstein’s answer is that the fact has a logical form and it is this logical form which has to be pictured. 
Every picture is thus a logical picture, though some pictures may also be spatial, like a photograph. What 
Wittgenstein means may be made clear by an example. The rise and fall of a patient’s temperature can be shown 
in a graph. The graph is spatial and temperature is not. And yet the curve of the graph can represent a picture of 
the patient’s temperature over a given period. It can be paraphrased in Wittgenstein’s own example: ‘A 
gramophone record, the musical idea, the written notes, and the bound-waves, all stand to one another in the 
same internal relation of depicting that holds between language and the world. They are all unstructured 
according to a common logical pattern. (Like the two youths in the fairy-tale, their two horses, and their lilies. 
They are all in a certain sense one)’.xiv 
 
Wittgenstein further analyses the nature of proposition by distinguishing elementary proposition and complex 
proposition. The elementary propositions are propositions which cannot further be divided into a basic 
meaningful statement, whereas the complex propositions are formed by a combination of two or more 
propositions with the help of logical connective. The elementary proposition is similar to Russell’s molecular 
proposition. According to Wittgenstein, the elementary proposition corresponds to the atomic fact. It is 
composed wholly of names in relation with the objects. This name is a simple sign which cannot be defined in 
terms of language; but its meaning can only be shown. Wittgenstein says that in the molecular proposition a 
propositional sign is a description and represents a complex. This description must be analysed into its 
constituent simple symbols and expressed in a definition. The meaning of the complex signs and of molecular 
propositions depends ultimately on that of simple signs and elementary propositions. Wittgenstein further puts 
it, ‘Every sign that has a definition signifies via the signs that serve to define it; and the definitions point the 
way. Two signs cannot signify in the same manner if one is primitive and other is defined by means of primitive 
signs. Names cannot be anatomized by means of definitions. (Nor can any sign that has a meaning 
independently and on its own)’.xv 
 
The possibility of resolving molecular propositions into elementary propositions has been called by Russell the 
principle of atomicity and it is of importance because it is used by Wittgenstein to show that all molecular 
propositions are the truth-functions of elementary propositions. The discovery of this new symbolism, the so-
called truth-functions, lead to the explanation of logical truth as ‘tautology’. Tautologous statements are 
according to Wittgenstein, the analytic statements such as ‘2 + 2 = 4’, ‘all bachelors are unmarried males’, etc. 
The truth of these statements can be demonstrated by logical or mathematical method without appealing to 
sensory experience. Their denial makes a contradiction. In one way or other they are, as Hume calls them, the 
relations of ideas and the logical positivists maintain as analytic or a priori statements. Thus, Wittgenstein holds 
that ‘tautologous and contradictions are ‘without sense’ because they do not picture the world’.xvi  
 
The contents of the Tractatus deal with logic in order to describe the world in terms of pictures. It is held in the 
Tractatus that any proposition presupposes the whole of language. ‘If objects are given, then at the same time 
we are given all objects. If elementary propositions are given, then at the same time all elementary propositions 
are given’ and ‘If all objects are given, then at the same time all possible states of affairs are also given’.xvii An 
elementary proposition is a combination of names, and in order to understand the proposition one must in some 
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sense know the objects for which the name stands. In understanding any proposition at all one must know all 
objects and all propositions. Any proposition whatever carries with it the whole of ‘logical space’. The essence 
of propositions is the ‘essence of all description and thus the essence of the world’.xviii This essence of 
proposition is the same as the universal form of proposition. That there is a universal form of proposition is 
proved by the fact that all possibilities – all forms of proposition – ‘must be foreseeable’. 
 
Language represents, or depicts, the reality of the world in the sense of signified assertions. An elementary 
proposition is a picture of reality especially of a state of affairs. In a picture a certain situation is depicted. It is 
the way in which the structure of language pictures a possible combination of elements in reality, a possible 
state of affairs. In a biographical sketch of Wittgenstein, G. H. von Wright puts the Tractatus in a nutshell as 
follows: ‘Wittgenstein’s Tractatus may be called a synthesis of the theory of truth-functions and the idea that 
language is a picture of reality. Out of which this synthesis arises a third main ingredient of the book, its 
doctrine of that which cannot be said, only shown’.xix 
 
The main concern of the Tractatus is to study the relationship between language and reality. Language always 
represents the reality of the world. S. N. Ganguly writes about the important role of the Tractatus in the analysis 
of language thus: ‘The world of reality not only determines the truth and falsity of our assertions but gives 
content to them. Language is hooked on to reality all the time by displaying in it a form common to the 
arrangement of facts. This is the famous picture theory of meaning’.xx This picture theory can be explained in 
the following two points. Firstly, Wittgenstein holds that there is a one-to-one relationship between the 
proposition and the fact. It is held in the sense that there is a fundamental similarity in between the structure of 
language and the structure of world. This corresponding relation is not a one-to-one correspondence between the 
judgment and the object of judgment which has been advanced in the correspondence theory of truth. This is 
because the propositions contain a larger number of signs than there are elements in the facts. The proposition 
includes signs which are logically constant, such as ‘all’, ‘some’, ‘not’, etc. but this sign does not represent or 
stand for anything in the outside world. They are merely symbolical devices. Secondly, just as Wittgenstein 
holds that the structure of the fact cannot be named so he contends that the sense of a proposition cannot be 
stated. A proposition shows its sense, but cannot explain it. We can only translate our sense into other forms of 
expression so that it will be clearer than the original. Margaret Macdonald also rightly comments that ‘the object 
of philosophy is the logical clarification of thought. The result of philosophy is not a number of “philosophical 
propositions” but to make proposition clear’.xxi The central underpinning idea of the Tractatus can be summed 
up as ‘what can be said at all can be said clearly’. Wittgenstein concludes his book with a bold remark that 
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